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Abstract
This paper formalizes the use of flexible labor contracts in an efficiency wage framework and derives market dualism as an endogenous outcome. By allowing temporary
contracts to be either renewed or converted into permanent contracts, new theoretical
insights emerge both on the equilibrium wage structure and the incentive problem faced
by workers and firms. Since temporary workers weigh the outside option of entering
the labor market through permanent positions, the rate at which fixed-term contracts are
converted into open-ended contracts is itself an incentive device which acts as a substitute for the wage. It follows that, even if temporary workers face a higher job loss risk,
firms pay a wage differential in favor of permanent workers. The model also predicts
that in equilibrium firms hire exclusively under flexible contracts, then half of them is
converted into stable contracts while the remaining contracts are left to expire. Thus,
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in steady state, firms let permanent positions to survive in order to sustain the wage
incentive structure.
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Introduction
Since the mid eighties, European labor markets have been deeply shaped by the spread

of fixed-term (also known as short-term or flexible) labor contracts. Moreover, political obstacles to reducing the employment protection coverage for already protected workers have
constrained legislators to implement reforms at the margin, leading to dualism in the labor
market1 .
While researchers have thoroughly investigated the impact of flexible contracts on unemployment (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990), job turnover and wages (Kugler, 1999, 2005), firms’
propensity to grow (Schivardi and Torrini, 2008), productivity growth (Bassanini et al., 2008)
and firms’ recruiting policies (Kahn, 2007), this paper has two main goals. First, we develop
a model featuring dualism in the labor market as an endogenous outcome sustained by efficiency wage considerations in the spirit of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Second, our paper
puts forward a possible explanation of the negative wage differential experienced by temporary workers with respect to permanent ones, even if it should be reasonable to reward a
higher job loss risk through higher wages.
Both the existence of a wage differential between temporary and permanent workers and
the survival in the market of both types of contract have been reported for many European
1 The

concept of dual labor market (also two-tier labor market) was originally set forth in the work of
Doeringer and Piore (1971) in the attempt to describe a labor market made up of a primary and a secondary
sector. Compared to jobs in the secondary sector, those in the primary sector generally have a higher pay, better
job security, stability and working conditions, more training and career opportunities.

Countries. Jimeno and Toharia (1993) find a 9-11% wage gap for the Spanish experience.
Blanchard and Landier (2002) conclude that the wage gap in France has risen from 12%
in 1983 to 22.5% in 2000. Hagen (2002) comes to similar conclusions for Germany, even
if different methodologies lead to sizable differences in the magnitude of the wage penalty
suffered by temporary workers.
Our theoretical argument starts from the way workers value fixed-term positions and results in the coexistence of contract types in the labor market equilibrium. The model formalizes the use of temporary contracts in an efficiency wage framework in which profit maximizer firms optimally set the share of temporary workers to satisfy participation and incentive
compatible constraints. We allow temporary contracts to be either renewed or converted into
permanent contracts to take into account multiple spells of unemployment and temporary
positions. Also, we endogenously determine optimal conversion and renewal rates without
relying on exogenous labor market institutional features. In this way, the incentive problem
changes dramatically, and so does the equilibrium wage structure.
This paper argues that the ratio of temporary to permanent workers is linked to the incentive structure arising in a dual labor market. When firms increase their temporary workforce,
the ratio of temporary contracts over permanent ones cannot exceed a given threshold because it would be impossible to provide sufficient incentives to avoid workers’ opportunistic
behavior. It follows that, when employers can renew fixed-term positions, convert them into
permanent ones or leave them to expire, the coexistence of both contracts is necessary to
ensure a steady state mass of non-shirking workers who are paid accordingly. We also show
the way in which the rate at which temporary jobs are converted into permanent ones affects
the wage differential.
Dual labor market theories have been developed in the attempt to explain why workers,
even if equally productive, are allocated in a primary or a secondary sector of the economy
and receive different wages. Although many models predict that wages should be increasing
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in the job loss risk, in contemporary labor markets, temporary workers are paid, on average,
less than their permanent counterparts even if they face greater uncertainty about their future
employment status2 . With the aim of explaining inter-industry and inter-occupation wage
differentials, Bulow and Summers (1986) elaborate a formal framework to analyze dualism
in the labor market. In their model, dualism is assumed rather than derived and jobs fall into
either the primary or the secondary sector because of technological duality. Assuming that
only the primary sector jobs must be monitored, the wage in that sector must be high enough
to induce workers not to shirk, while in the secondary sector workers are paid the value of
the marginal product of labor. In equilibrium there will be a wage differential between workers of different sectors that cannot be absorbed by market forces. Subsequently, even in the
absence of variation in monitoring technology across firms, Rebitzer and Taylor (1991) have
shown that dual labor markets may also arise as a consequence of product demand uncertainty. Moreover, even if workers are homogeneous and perfect substitutes in production,
a single profit-maximizing firm may find it optimal to simultaneously offer both secondary
and primary jobs. Differently, Albrecht and Vroman (1992) endogenize the persistence of
“good jobs” and “bad jobs” by assuming both non-convexity in the monitoring technology
and worker heterogeneity on the value placed on leisure. We stress the fact that in our model
dualism does not depend on sectorial, firm or worker heterogeneity, but is simply triggered
by the way workers put value on the potential gain or loss of opportunistic behaviors.
More recently, some authors have tried to derive dualism in a search and matching framework. Berton and Garibaldi (2012) suggest that the equilibrium ratio of temporary to permanent contracts can be driven by the trade-off faced by firms between an ex-ante slower job
filling rate and an ex-post more flexible dismissal rate3 . Differently, Wasmer (2001) points
2 One

would expect wage compensating differentials to work for jobs with higher unemployment risk in
order to become sufficiently attractive (Rosen, 1986). However, empirical research has shown that even after controlling for personal and firm characteristics, the wage differential between permanent and temporary
workers does not vanish (Booth et al. 2002 and Hagen, 2002).
3 Nevertheless, in their model, wages for permanent and temporary jobs are assumed to be equal, meaning
that price movements, and their allocative effects, are ruled out.
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out that the coexistence of long- and short-term contracts depends on an arbitrage between
endogenous turnover costs and the expected profit depending on the duration of the job. Their
results derive from a variant of the capitalization effect of growth discussed in Aghion and
Howitt (1994), which increases the tightness of labour markets and, therefore, induces firms
to retain workers by offering them long-term contracts.
To sum up, without relying on differences in the hiring and firing costs or other institutional features of the market, this paper contributes to the strand of the literature aimed
at describing the conditions under which fixed-term and open-ended contracts coexist as an
equilibrium in which equally skilled and productive workers are paid different wages.
Moreover, the model yields three corollary results. First, dualism is both a market and
a firm feature. Even if workers are perfect substitutes in production, a single firm finds it
optimal to employ both types of contract, and market dualism is, thus, a consequence of the
internal dualism. Second, there will be rationing4 also for those who are already employed as
fixed-term workers. While they would prefer a permanent contract, firms limit the number of
permanent contracts to a given threshold in order to keep lower the overall wage bill. Since
the adjustment of internal workforce composition does not alter the level of unemployment,
the incentives not to shirk are still effective. Third, in line with the observed evidence that the
majority of newly hired workers enter the labor market through fixed-term positions5 , given
the steady state fraction of flexible workforce set by firms, entrants in the labor market are
always offered flexible contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We
start formalizing the use of temporary contracts in an efficiency wage framework. Then, we
derive the no-shirking conditions and solve the problem faced by firms about the optimal
4 As

in the standard model of efficiency wages, unemployment is involuntary. Indeed, at the ongoing wage
structure, workers are willing to accept a job but, given the negative relationship between wages and unemployment, firms know that unemployment would not serve anymore as an effective discipline device, because one
more hiring would lower effort and productivity of workers.
5 See, among others, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Goux et al.
(2001).
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renewal and conversion rates. Finally, we focus on the steady state conditions to characterize
the labor market equilibrium. Section 3 discusses some final remarks and concludes.

2

The Model

2.1

Structure and contractual relationships

The model is set in continuous time. The economy is populated by H infinitely-lived
risk neutral workers identical in their abilities, skills and preferences. There are N perfectly
competitive firms and labor is the only input for production. Profit-maximizer firms face
inelastic supply of labor and employ all the labor they want. Workers aim at maximizing the
expected present value of their lifetime utility. Workers and firms discount at the common
rate δ .
An employer-employee relationship can be regulated either by a permanent contract (p)
or a fixed-term one (t). The latter lasts for one period and, at the expiration, it can be converted into a permanent contract with probability c p , renewed as a temporary position with
probability ct or left to expire with probability 1 − c p − ct 6 . Through this structure, the model
is able to simulate a work-life pattern in which workers may reach a stable job after a succession of short-term jobs and unemployment spells.
At a given moment in time, workers can either be employed or unemployed. If unemployed, workers are available for employment opportunities and do not receive unemployment benefits. Instead, employed workers enjoy an instantaneous utility which is a function
of wages and effort, U (wi , e) = wi − e, where wi is the wage received while holding the i −th
contract (i = {p,t}) and e is the effort. The level of effort can take only two values, positive
and constant (no-shirking) or null (shirking). In the latter case there is no production. Since
6 The

rates of contract renewal and conversion are endogenously set by firms, however they must be thought
of as given from the workers’ point of view.
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all workers are identical, they behave in the same way and whether or not they shirk depends
on the incentives they face. If workers decide to shirk, the effort is null and they gain higher
levels of utility while facing a probability b (which is exogenously given) of being caught
shirking and then being fired. It follows that, on average, shirkers tend to spend more time
as unemployed. In addition, while permanent jobs disappear at the exogenous rate q, temporary workers become unemployed as a direct consequence of the endogenous choice of firms
about renewal and conversion rates7 . Although non-shirker workers enjoy lower levels of
utility with respect to shirkers, given that effort is costly, they have better expectations about
their job stability.
Finally, unemployed workers can enter the labor market by receiving a job offer for a
permanent contract at the rate a p or a temporary contract at the rate at . Since firms choose
workers at random out of the pool of unemployed workers, the probability of finding a job is
affected by the rate of job breakups, the level of unemployment and the stock of employed
workers. Whether the employer-employee relationship is regulated by a fixed-term contract
or a permanent one depends on firms’ choice about the optimal workforce composition8 .
Therefore, defining 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 as the fraction of temporary workers per firm, both arrival
rates turn out to depend also on the workforce composition9 .
Given the structure of the economy, firms and workers interact as follows. First, each
profit-maximizer firm chooses the optimal fraction of temporary workers ( f ); second, it sets
the labor force it requires (L); third, it offers the wage wi (i = {p,t}) consistent with the
specific contract. These wages are efficiency wages which minimize labor costs per efficiency unit. Since a job opportunity provides almost the utility of an unemployment position,
workers will accept opportunities that arise and choose the effort level.
7 While

the assumption that temporary jobs do not disappear at an exogenous rate makes our results comparable to the standard model of efficiency wages, it does not alter our results.
8 Note that, we are not ruling out the possibility that each firm chooses to keep its entire workforce under
temporary contracts rather than permanent ones.
9 As before, a , a and f must be thought of as given from the workers’ point of you.
p t
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2.2

Asset Values and No-Shirking Conditions

In this section, first we briefly characterize the well-known effort decision problem faced
by permanent workers. Then, we formalize the case of temporary workers.
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), imperfect monitoring implies different asset values
according to the option of being, respectively, a non-shirker or a shirker. Let Vpn and Vps be,
respectively, the present discounted value of lifetime utility for a non-shirker and a shirker
holding a permanent contract. In continuous time, regular dynamics asserts that the asset
value equals the wage plus the expected gain (or loss) related to changes in the employment
status. Thus:

δVpn = (w p − e) − q(Vpn −Vu )

(1)

δVps = w p − (q + b)(Vps −Vu ),

(2)

and

where Vu is the value of being unemployed. The usual interpretation holds. Workers will
avoid opportunistic behavior only if the expected lifetime utility of being a non-shirker is no
smaller than that of being a shirker. Therefore, under permanent contracts, the problem faced
by a firm is to set the wage sufficiently high to deter shirking. Thus, when a firm chooses
the efficiency wage, w p , the minimum rent that permanent workers receive is given by the
following no-shirking condition:
e
Vp −Vu = .
b

(3)

The economics behind this result is that the penalty upon shirking, i.e. the asset loss, should
be severe enough so as to deter opportunistic behavior. Since workers are homogeneous and
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the value of being unemployed is the same for all workers, there is a unique (lowest) level of
wage satisfying equation (3):
e
w p = e + δVu + (δ + q).
b

(4)

According to the principal-agent paradigm, under permanent contracts, firms use an incentive
scheme built on current wages. Differently, as it will become clear in what follows, in the twotier system, firms will also be able to exploit temporary workers’ expectations over contract
renewal and conversion.
As for workers with open-ended contract, temporary workers choose whether or not to
shirk by comparing the relevant asset values. Specifically, while instantaneous utility is
higher for shirkers (wt ) than non-shirkers (wt − e), the expectation of remaining employed
is shorter for the former than the latter because of the probability b of being caught shirking.
Moreover, fixed-term workers can enjoy either a conversion into a permanent position or a
renewal of the temporary contract with probability, respectively, c p and ct .
In detail, changes in the employment status produce the following expected gains (or
losses). Consider virtuous workers first. When the contract is renewed, even if the asset
does not change, workers suffer the loss of opportunity of becoming a permanent worker by
receiving a direct offer for a permanent position. We quantify the magnitude of this outside
option as the value of becoming unemployed and enjoy the unemployed-to-permanent job
transition (Vp − Vu ) conditional on the probability of finding a job from the pool of unemployed (a p )10 . Think of a temporary worker, when she receives the news that her contract has
been renewed, of course she is happy because she will earn the wage for another period, but at
the same time she is also unhappy because she knows that during the same period she cannot
get a permanent job offer. In case of conversion, workers enjoy the asset difference between
10 As

a consequence, we do not explicitly formalize the choice of accepting/rejecting a job offer, rather we
rule out that employed workers search on the job.
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permanent and temporary positions (Vps −Vts ) weighted by the probability c p . Finally, in case
of firms’ inactive behavior, fixed-term employees separate from their jobs with probability
(1 − ct − c p ).
We now consider idler workers behavior. By catching a shirker with probability b, firms
fire the worker whose asset loss equals (Vt − Vu ). In addition, the worker suffers the loss
of the opportunity of a conversion in a permanent contract. Hence, the term c p (Vps − Vts )
represents the value of the opportunity that shirkers lose when they are caught and fired as
a consequence of their opportunistic behavior. Therefore, even if dismissed anyway, the
penalty that a worker pays for her misdemeanor is worse than that she had to pay in case of
firm’s inactive behavior11 .
Summing up, the asset values for non-shirker and shirker workers holding a temporary
contract read, respectively, as follows:

δVtn = (wt − e) +
+ {ct [(Vtn −Vtn ) −a p (Vpn −Vu )] +
{z
}
|
outside option

{z

|

renewal


+ c p Vpn −Vtn +
{z
}
|

}
(5)

conversion

− (1 − ct − c p ) (Vtn −Vu )}
|
{z
}
f irm0 s inactive behavior

and

11 Our

idea that workers put value also on opportunities is close to Akerlof and Katz’s (1989) concept about
the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund when workers are caught shirking. Their arguments rely on
the workers’ effort decision which is not only driven by current wage but also by deferred wages, namely the
trust fund.
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δVts = wt +

− b{(Vts −Vu ) + c p Vps −Vts } +
| {z } |
{z
}
asset loss

(6)

opportunity loss

 


+ (1 − b) ct (Vts −Vts ) − a p Vps −Vu + c p Vps −Vts − (1 − ct − c p ) (Vts −Vu ) .

The fixed-term worker chooses to exert effort if the value of not shirking is at least as large
as the value of shirking. Thus, the no-shirking condition for temporary workers can be found
by equating the previous two equations:

(Vt −Vu )ct − a p (Vp −Vu )ct + [(Vp −Vu ) + (Vp −Vt )]c p = be .

(7)

Given that agents exhibit a forward looking behavior, current workers’ decision is affected
by future opportunities. In other words, workers are interested in future wages, but they know
that these are conditional on the probability of being a temporary or a permanent worker in
the next period. In more detail, the way firms can provide incentives to workers - the LHS of
equation 7 - can be decomposed in three terms. The first two addends tells us that, for a given
conversion rate, an increase in the renewal rate has two distinct effects. From the one side, a
greater ct affects positively the incentive profile because of the lower probability of becoming
unemployed, i.e. the punishment is less tough. On the other side, the renewal of a temporary
contract implies that the worker still receives the wage as a fixed-term worker, but she has
to wait the next period to find out whether she will move to a permanent position. Thus,
by increasing the value of the outside option of entering the labor market as a permanent
worker from the pool of unemployed, a higher ct also affects negatively the incentive profile.
Differently, the last term implies that c p can act as an incentive device. Furthermore, this
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incentive is more effective the greater is the value of permanent contracts with respect to
unemployment and temporary positions. Thus, under a fixed-term contract, a worker may
accept a lower current wage as long as it is easier to become a permanent worker through a
conversion in the next period.

2.3

Wages, Participation Constraints and Optimal Renewal and Conversion Rates

In this section, we proceed to analyze the incentive compatible wage structure arising in
the two-tier system when firms optimally set renewal and conversion rates.
Considering the two no-shirking conditions together (equations 3 and 7), the difference
between the value of permanent and temporary jobs is:

(Vp −Vt ) =

e (1 − c p − ct + ct a p )
.
b
(c p − ct )

(8)

By plugging equation 8 in equation 7, we rewrite the no-shirking condition of temporary
workers to derive the rent that they enjoy with respect of being unemployed in terms of
renewal and conversion rates:

(Vt −Vu ) =

e (2c p − ct a p − 1)
.
b
(c p − ct )

(9)

Equations 3 and 9 must be interpreted not only as the incentive compatible constraints, but
also as participation constraints. As such, they are relevant to highlight the difference in
the way firms may arrange the terms of contracts when dealing with temporary rather than
permanent workers. In detail, the contract offered to permanent workers turns to be attrac-
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tive because the condition to avoid shirking also implies that the rent enjoyed by workers is
strictly positive. Moreover, since the size of this rent depends exogenously on the effort and
the detection technology, it can not be reduced without violating the no-shirking condition.
Instead, as far as temporary workers are concerned, firms can modify the size of the rent
through the conversion and renewal rates. In this way they are able to deter shirking even by
setting a null rent. Specifically, the value of being a non-shirker is no smaller than that of
being a shirker also when the value of a temporary contract equals the reservation utility of
being unemployed.
By looking at equation 9, figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the space of
all the possible combinations of the conversion and renewal rates for which, given a p , 0 <
ct + c p ≤ 112 .
The areas “A” and “B” identify all combinations for which, respectively, c p < ct and
c p > ct . In both areas, firms deter shirking by paying a strictly positive premium over the
reservation utility (i.e. Vt − Vu > 0). Differently, in the area “C”, the values of ct and c p are
such that workers strictly prefer unemployment to temporary positions (i.e. Vt − Vu < 0)13 .
Finally, the area “E” represents the set of all the possible combinations of ct and c p such that
Vt −Vu = 0.
Since employers find it optimal not to pay an extra rent over the minimum needed to
induce effort, the area “E” identifies the minimum incentive space which is characterized by
the following conditions14 :

12 Obviously,

when c p = ct = 0, it would be impossible to avoid shirking.
area includes the cases for which the renewal and conversion rates are equal (ct = c p 6= 0) and no
finite wages exist to deter shirking.
14
way to derive the solution is to solve for ct . In this case, it can be shown that the conditions are
( Another
2c −1
ct = app
.
1+a p
1
2 ≤ c p ≤ 2+a p
13 This

13

Figure 1: Minimum incentive space
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0 ≤ ct ≤

In this area, the conversion rate is increasing both in the renewal and the arrival rate of permanent positions. The interpretation is straightforward. Higher values of a p and ct increase
the asset loss related to the outside option which has to be compensated with a higher expectation of being converted into a permanent contract. Intuitively, the higher is the opportunity
to find a permanent job directly from the stock of unemployment, the more the employer
has to reward the lower utility. Since the workers’ effort decision is driven both by current
and future wages, firms may reward the lower utility either by a higher current wage or by
a higher probability of a conversion in a permanent position. Thus, it easy to show that the
efficiency wage for temporary workers is decreasing in c p . This means that under fixed-term
contract firms can provide substitutable incentives: the higher the conversion rate, the lower
the wage paid to temporary workers and vice-versa.
By plugging equations 3, 8, 9 and 10 into 5 and recalling equation 4, the efficiency wages
result:



w p = e + δVu + e (q + δ )
b



wt = e + δVu + e
b

1
1
2 ct a p − 2

.

(11)



Clearly w p > wt , thus firms can use the conversion and the renewal rates as an optimal strategy
to avoid shirking and, simultaneously, minimize the wage bill of temporary workers. Even in
the presence of equally productive workers, the existence of dual labor markets implies that
firms find it optimal to pay a wage differential in favor of permanent workers. Once the noshirking conditions are satisfied, an extra unit of money paid to workers would not produce
any additional benefit to the firm, but would only result in higher costs. Therefore firms set
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the optimal level of c p and ct in order to minimize the labor costs. Thus, by looking at the
minimum incentive space as defined in 10 and taking into account that wt is increasing in ct ,
the optimal conversion and renewal rates are:



c∗p =

1
2

.

(12)



ct∗ = 0
Now we return to the incentive problem by considering the value of being unemployed.
As described in section 2.1, unemployed workers can enter the labor market either through
permanent or temporary contracts, respectively, at arrival rate a p and at . Therefore, the value
of being unemployed reads as follows:

δVu = a p (Vp −Vu ) + at (Vt −Vu ) ,

(13)

where those who become employed enjoy the asset change by moving away from the unemployed stock.
Since temporary workers are paid the reservation utility, it is easy to write an explicit
solution for the wage incentive structure:



w p = e + e (δ + q + a p )
b

.

(14)



wt = e + e (a p − c∗p )
b
Equations in 14 state that the wages needed to elicit effort are increasing both in the level
of effort and in the arrival rate a p and, are decreasing in the probability to detect shirking. In
particular, both the exogenous separation rate and the discount rate positively affect only the
wage of permanent workers. Also, two implications are worth noticing. First, equations in 14
imply the existence of a wage differential increasing in the rate of conversion of temporary
positions. This result adds to the existing literature a novel rational to the existence of wage
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inequality by arguing that it is a direct consequence of firms’ recruiting policies. Second,
since temporary workers weigh the outside option of entering the labor market through permanent positions and given the negative sign of c∗p , the rate at which fixed-term contracts are
converted into open-ended contracts is itself an incentive device which acts as a substitute for
the wage.

2.4

Equilibrium flows and endogenous arrival rates

In the original model, the economy reaches its steady state when the flows into and out
the unemployment stock balance to each other. However, in our model, this steady state
condition is not sufficient to identify the rates at which unemployed workers find jobs under
fixed-term or open-ended contracts. It is thus convenient to consider separately the stocks of
permanent and temporary workers. In this way, we are able to disentangle the effect of the
conversion rate on the arrival rates. In more detail, workers who experience a conversion are,
simultaneously, an inflow in the stock of permanent workers and an outflow from the stock
of temporary workers.
Given the number of firms (N) and the fraction of temporary workers ( f ), we proceed
to define the flows of the relevant stocks. Let consider the stock of permanent workers first.
Workers enter this stock either from the pool of unemployed (H − NL) - when they receive
a permanent job offer at rate a p - or from the stock of temporary workers (NL f ) - when
they experience a conversion at rate c∗p . Movements out of this stock are given by permanent
workers (NL(1 − f )) who become unemployed at the exogenous separation rate q. Differently, the stock of temporary workers accrues at the rate at because of the hirings from the
unemployment pool and shrinks at the rate (1 − ct∗ − c∗p ) because of firm’s inactive behavior.
Thus, the equilibrium flows are:
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a p (H − NL) + NL f c∗p = NL(1 − f )q

f low o f permanent workers




at (H − NL) = NL f c∗p + 1 − ct∗ − c∗p

f low o f temporary workers

.

(15)

As a consequence, the endogenous arrival rates results:



a p =

NL
(H−NL)



at =

NL
(H−NL)

q (1 − f ) − 12 f


.

(16)

f

Clearly, when the market collapses to the one-tier system and no temporary positions are
available (i.e. f = 0), the rate at which firms hire workers is the same as in Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984). It is easy to check that while a p is decreasing in f , at is increasing and that,
since the arrival rates increase with respect to aggregate employment, the efficiency wages in
equations 14 are increasing functions of the level of employment.
Finally, it is worth noting that the rates crucially depend on the fraction of flexible labor
in the economy ( f ). Also, for the rates to be interpretable as arrival rates (a p , at ≥ 0), f must
lie in the following range:

0≤ f ≤

2.5

2q
.
2q + 1

(17)

Labor market equilibrium

Once the wage incentive structure and the endogenous arrival rates are known, we close
the model by looking at the labor market equilibrium.
The N perfectly competitive firms share the same technology and each of them seeks to
maximize profits. The firm’s problem is to choose the composition of its labor force in terms
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of temporary and permanent workers (i.e. the optimal fraction of temporary contracts) and to
set the labor force it requires (L).
0

00

We assume a well-behaved production function F(eL) (with F (•) > 0 and F (•) < 0)
and, since the firm’s decisions at each point in time do not affect future profits, it is sufficient
to consider instantaneous total profits, as described by:

Π = F(eL) − (1 − f )Lw p − f Lwt .

(18)

Given the perfect substitutability of labor services15 , firms can produce each level of
output by employing workers either under permanent contracts, temporary contracts or a
combination of both. Since each type of contract is paid differently, the cost of each efficient
unit of labor (w) is a linear combination of the efficiency wages weighted by f (i.e. w =
(1 − f )w p + f wt ). Then, finding the optimal amount of the labor force requires combining
the wages in order to find what can be referred as the overall marginal cost curve. Substituting
for the endogenous arrival rates of 16 into 14, simple algebra gives us the following aggregate
no-shirking condition:



H
1
e
δ (1 − f ) +
q(1 − f ) − f
.
w = e+
b
H − NL
2

(19)

Since each firm sets the labor force up to the point where the marginal product equals the
overall marginal cost of labor, the equilibrium is given by:
0

eF (eL) = w.

(20)

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the labor market equilibrium for any value
of f . At the point E, workers exert the effort and each firm employs the optimal amount of
15 While

there are many economic explanations that justify the heterogeneity of productivity, we prefer to
consider that permanent and temporary workers are equally productive. In this way, we are confident that our
results do not depend upon any over-imposed economic structure.
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Figure 2: Labor Market Equilibrium
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labor (L∗ ) by paying w∗p and wt∗ , respectively, to permanent and fixed-term workers.
It is easy to note that an increase of the fraction of fixed-term contract reduces both the
efficiency wage of permanent and temporary workers and the overall marginal cost. Intuitively, while in the original model unemployment is the only penalty for being caught and
fired, in our model the punishment can be broader interpreted as the utility loss of not having
a permanent position. Thus, since a higher f implies a lower stock of permanent workers, the
punishment is more effective and it easier to induce workers to be productive. But to what
extent firms can increase f in order to enjoy lower labor costs? The choice of the optimal
fraction of temporary contracts must be sustainable in the long-run equilibrium, thus it needs
to be compatible with the incentive structure able to deter shirking. In more detail, for each
level of output, the combination of permanent and temporary workers which minimize the
production costs is the set of the intersection points between the isocosts and the isoquants.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the problem. Obviously, since permanent
workers are paid more than temporary ones, the isocosts are flatter than the isoquants. Thus,
the intersection points between each isoquant and the vertical axis show the case in which
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Figure 3: Cost minimization
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firms use exclusively permanent contracts as in Shapiro-Stiglitz. Differently, the intersection
points between each isoquant and the horizontal axis relates to the opposite case in which
firms use only temporary workers. We stress the fact that since employees are equally productive under both types of contract and permanent workers are paid more than temporary
ones, the higher the value of f , the lower the cost of labor. Moreover, the production expansion path, defined as the ratio between the optimal number of permanent and temporary
workers for each level of production, is represented in figure 3 as the increasing line with a
slope negatively related to f . Even though firms would always prefer to offer a temporary
contract rather than a permanent one, they must also guarantee the equilibrium conversion
rate in order to elicit effort16 . As a result, the incentive structure can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome only if permanent workers do not disappear and temporary workers enjoy a
credible expectation to be promoted into a permanent position. Then, each firm will convert
half of temporary workers into permanent positions (i.e. c∗p = 12 ). Therefore, there exists an
equilibrium value of f for which, in steady state, firms maintain the minimum number of
16 It

means that, in equilibrium, workers’ expectations are fulfilled.
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permanent contracts and are able to lower the wage bill as much as possible. However, while
the area below the line of the production expansion path in figure 3 relates to unfeasible combinations of permanent and temporary workers, the intersection points between each isoquant
and the production expansion path show, for each level of output, the evolution of the optimal
workforce composition where firms produce at the lowest sustainable cost.
By looking at the aggregate no-shirking condition (equation 19), it easy to check that
 H 
profits are increasing in f (i.e. ∂∂Πf = be δ + q + 12 H−NL
> 0) and thus, each firm sets the
value of f as higher as possible, but still in the feasible range described in 17. Therefore, the
equilibrium value of the fraction of temporary workers results:
2q
.
2q + 1

f∗ =

(21)

By plugging f ∗ into 16, we obtain a p = 0, meaning that each level of production can be
achieved at a lower cost by hiring from the stock of unemployed exclusively under fixed-term
contracts. It follows that the inflow into the stock of permanent workers is ultimately given by
the conversion of temporary contracts. Beyond the equilibrium threshold of f ∗ , firms would
be converting too many fixed-term workers and, consequently, should fire permanent workers
to keep unaltered the workforce composition.

3

Conclusions
This paper formalizes a novel source of labor market dualism in an efficiency wage frame-

work where firms have the option to hire workers under flexible or permanent contracts and
are able to control the internal mobility toward permanent positions through the conversion
of temporary contracts.
By arguing that the conversion rate acts as a substitute for the wage of temporary workers,
our analysis sheds light on the nature of the wage differential in favor of permanent workers,
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even though it should be reasonable to reward a higher job loss risk through higher wages.
However, firms find it optimal to shape their recruiting policies in a way that ensures the
survival of open-ended contracts in the long run. Even if firms would tend to substitute
permanent workers with temporary ones, the ratio of temporary contracts cannot exceed a
given threshold because it would be unfeasible to avoid workers’ opportunistic behavior.
Indeed, since the incentive scheme offered to fixed-term workers includes the conversion rate
as a tool to induce workers to be productive, the tool becomes effective only if workers can
actually observe a given fraction of permanent jobs. Then, dualism arises as a feature internal
to each firm and, only consequently, as a market property.
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